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Abstract
I show the quasi-truth of a sentence in a partial structure to be equivalent
to the truth of a specific Ramsey sentence in a structure that corresponds
naturally to the partial structure. Hence quasi-truth, the core notion of the
partial structures approach, can be captured in the terms of the received
view on scientific theories as developed by Carnap and Hempel. I further
show that a mapping is a partial homomorphism/isomorphism between
two partial structures if and only if it is a homomorphism/isomorphism
between their corresponding structures. It is a corollary that the partial
structures approach can be expressed in first or second order model theory.
Keywords: partial structure; quasi-truth; pragmatic truth; partial truth;
subtruth; partial homomorphism; partial isomorphism; model theory;
expansion; Ramsey sentence; received view; logical empiricism
The partial structures approach is in the vanguard of the semantic view on scientific
theories and models (da Costa and French 2000; Le Bihan 2011, n. 3, §5), and it is
one of the main reasons why the received view on scientific theories as developed
within logical empiricism by, for example, Carnap (1966) and Hempel (1958)
is considered inferior to the semantic view (French and Ladyman 1999). I will
show that the core notion of the partial structures approach, quasi-truth, can be
captured very naturally within the received view.
The partial structures approach is motivated by a simple epistemological point:
Most of the time, scientists do not have enough information about a domain to
determine its structure with arbitrary precision. For most relations, it is at best
known of some tuples of objects that they fall under the relation and known of
some objects that they do not fall under it. For many if not most tuples this is
unknown. Similarly, the value of a function is not know for all of its possible
arguments. Partial structures are defined to take this lack of knowledge into
account.
∗Theoretical Philosophy Unit, Utrecht University. sebastian.lutz@gmx.net. I thank Thomas
Müller and Janneke van Lith for helpful comments and Leszek Wron´ski for suggesting to describe
partial structures via structures in the first place.
Sebastian Lutz Quasi-Truth as Truth of a Ramsey Sentence—Draft: 2011–08–22
Assume a languageL = {Ri , F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , where Ri is an mi -place rela-
tion symbol for every i ∈ I , F j an n j -place function symbol for every j ∈ J , and
ck a constant symbol for every k ∈K .1 While most works on partial structures in
the philosophy of science (e. g., da Costa and French 1990; 2000) do not consider
functions, and the foundational paper by Mikenberg et al. (1986) does not consider
constants, the respective definitions can be easily combined to give
Definition 1. A˜ is a partialL -structure if and only if
A˜=


A,


RA˜,+i , R
A˜,−
i , R
A˜,◦
i

, F A˜j , c
A˜
k

i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , (1)
where

RA˜,+i , R
A˜,−
i , R
A˜,◦
i
	
is a partition of Ami for each i ∈ I , F A˜j : CA˜, j −→A is a
function with domain C
A˜, j ⊆An j for each j ∈ J , and c A˜k ∈A for each k ∈K .
The definition of partial structures by Mikenberg et al. (1986, def. 1) is recov-
ered for K = ∅, the definition by da Costa and French (1990, 255f) for J = ∅.2
Lack of knowledge is represented by non-empty sets RA˜,◦i and sets CA˜, j ⊂An j , for
which F A˜j is a proper partial function on A
n j . Constant symbols are interpreted
as in a structure, and thus not used to express lack of knowledge.3
The core notion of the partial structures approach, quasi-truth, also takes
background knowledge into account, expressed by the primary statements, a set Π˜
ofL -sentences (Mikenberg et al. 1986, def. 3; da Costa and French 1990, 256):
Definition 2. L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partialL -structure A˜ relative to Π˜ if
and only if there is anL -structureB with B =A, RA˜,+i ⊆ RBi ⊆Ami −RA,−i for
each i ∈ I , FBj |CA˜, j = F A˜j for each j ∈ J , and cBk = c A˜k for each k ∈K ,4 such that
B  {ϕ} ∪ Π˜ . (2)
Quasi-truth is also called ‘pragmatic truth’ and ‘partial truth’. One of the
most important properties of quasi-truth is that incompatible sentences can
be quasi-true without quasi-truth being trivial: Let A˜ be the partial structure
1I will more or less follow the model theoretic notation of Chang and Keisler (1990), so that, for
example, A is the domain dom (A) of structure A, and RA is the extension of R in A.
2While da Costa and French (1990, 255) define partial structures only for relations, their further
definition of quasi truth presumes that partial structures can contain constants as well.
3Thus this treatment of constants cannot capture situations in which constants are unknown or
not known with arbitrary precision (cf. Lutz 2011, §3.2).
4B is called an extension of A˜, and A˜-normal iff B  Π˜. If Π˜ is taken to contain only the
penumbral connections of the language, an A˜-normal structure is a complete extension of an A˜-
structure in the sense of Fine (1975, §2). Quasi-truth is then subtruth (cf. Hyde 1997). Although
partial structures can thus formally be seen as giving vague denotations to a vocabulary, quasi-truth
is meant as an epistemic, not a semantic concept.
2
Sebastian Lutz Quasi-Truth as Truth of a Ramsey Sentence—Draft: 2011–08–22


A,


RA˜,+1 , R
A˜,−
1 , R
A˜,◦
1

, c A˜1

with A= {1,2,3}, RA˜,+1 = {1}, RA˜,−1 = {3}, c A˜1 = 2,
and Π˜ =∅. Then R1c and ¬R1c are both quasi-true, while ¬∃xRx is not.
In a partial structure, a relation symbol Ri has, in a sense, two separate inter-
pretations. For one, there are its clear instances RA˜,+i . They can be determined, for
example, by their similarity to paradigmatic instances of Ri , or, more likely when
it comes to scientific terms, by the fulfillment of some sufficient condition. Then
there are also the clear non-instances RA˜,−i . These are determined, for example,
by their similarity to paradigmatic non-instances of Ri , or by the failure to fulfill
some necessary condition. Determining whether some tuple is in RA˜,+i is thus
more or less unrelated to determining whether some tuple is in RA˜,−i . (That a
tuple is in RA˜,◦i will typically only be determined by its being in neither R
A˜,+
i nor
RA˜,−i .) Given the difference in determining the members of R
A˜,+
i and of R
A˜,−
i , it
is natural to assign separate symbols of a language to these two concepts, say, R+i
and R−i .
In a partial structure, the interpretation F A˜j of an n j -place function symbol
F j can be seen as the clear instances of an n j + 1-ary relation. In analogy to the
relation symbols in partial structures, it is natural to assign an n j +1-place relation
symbol F +j to the concept that determines these clear instances. F
A˜
j does not have
a value if its argument is not in C
A˜, j , and thus for every n j + 1-tuple not in the
relation named by F +j , it is unknown whether it falls under the function or not.
Thus there is no need for a relation symbol that names the clear non-instances of
F j .
5
Since constant symbols are interpreted in the usual way, this leads to a new
languageL ′ = {R+i , R−i , F +j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , chosen so that {R+i , R−i , F +j }i∈I , j∈J ∩
L =∅. And any partial structure forL determines a structure forL ′:
Definition 3. L ′-structure A corresponds to partial L -structure A˜ if and only
if dom (A) = dom
 
A˜

, R+i
A = RA˜,+i and R
−
i
A = RA˜,−i for each i ∈ I , F +j A =
a¯b | a¯ ∈C
A˜, j and F
A˜
j (a¯) = b
	
for each j ∈ J , and cAk = c A˜k for each k ∈K .
a¯ here stands for the tuple (a1, . . . ,an j ) ∈ An j , and a¯b for the tuple
(a1, . . . ,an j , b ) ∈ An j+1. Note that for every partial structure A˜ there is ex-
actly one structure A that corresponds to A˜.
Despite having two separate interpretations, the relation symbols R+i and R
−
i
are of course connected, since they are known to refer to instances and, respec-
tively, non-instances of the same relation symbol Ri fromL . This connection,
5Incidentally, this treatment of functions cannot capture situations in which the values of
functions are only known up to a certain precision (cf. Lutz 2011, §3.2).
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and the fact that over a restricted domain, F +j is equivalent to a function F j are thus
background assumptions. They can therefore be described by primary statements
in languageL ∗ =L ∪L ′:
Π= Π˜∪⋃
i∈I
∀x¯(R+i x¯→ Ri x¯),∀x¯(R−i x¯→¬Ri x¯)	
∪⋃
j∈J
∀x¯∀y(F +j x¯y→ F j x¯ = y)	 (3)
On the syntactic level, x¯ stands for a non-repeating string of mi or n j variables,
and x¯y for the non-repeating concatenation of x¯ and y. In every structure A that
corresponds to a partial structure, relation F +j
A can provide a sufficient condition
for function values because by definition 3, tuples in F +j
A differ in their last
elements only if they also differ in one of their previous elements.
Since the structure A corresponding to a partialL -structure A˜ is itself anL ′-
structure, Π cannot be true in A. However, Πmay be true in an expansion of A to
L ∗, which differs fromA only in that it interprets the symbols inL ∗−L ′. With
the help of corresponding structures, it is now possible to describe quasi-truth
relative to Π˜:
Claim 1. L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partial L -structure A˜ with respect to Π˜ if
and only if the correspondingL ′-structure has an expansion C such that
C  {ϕ} ∪Π . (4)
Proof. ‘⇐’: Let A correspond to A˜ and C be an expansion of A such that C 
{ϕ} ∪Π. Then C|L  {ϕ} ∪ Π˜, dom (C|L ) = dom (C) = A, and RA˜,+i = R+i A =
R+i
C ⊆ RC|Li ⊆Ami−R−i C =Ami−R−i A =Ami−RA˜,−i for each i ∈ I . Furthermore,
for each a¯ ∈C
A˜, j , F
C|L
j (a¯) = b if a¯b ∈ F +j C, and, since F C|Lj is a function, also only
if a¯b ∈ F +j C. Since further F +j C = F +j A, and a¯b ∈ F +j A if and only if a¯ ∈CA˜, j and
F A˜j (a¯) = b , it holds that F
C|L
j |CA˜, j = F A˜j for each j ∈ J . Finally, c
C|L
k
= cAk = c
A˜
k .
Thus C|L is A˜-normal and hence ϕ is quasi-true in A˜.
‘⇒’: Let A be theL ′-structure that corresponds to A˜ and let ϕ be quasi-true
in A˜ with respect to Π˜. Then there is anL -structure B such that B  Π˜∪ {ϕ}
and R+i
A = RA˜,+i ⊆ RBi ⊆Ami −RA˜,−i =Ami −R−i A for each i ∈ I . Furthermore,
F A˜j = F
B
j |CA˜, j and thus for each a¯ ∈An j and b ∈A, a¯b ∈ F +j
A only if FBj (a¯) = b
for each j ∈ J . Finally, cAk = c A˜k = cBk for each k ∈K . Define theL ∗-structure C
so that C|L ′ =A and C|L =B. Then C  {ϕ} ∪Π.
4
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Somewhat shorter, ϕ is quasi-true in A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if its
corresponding structure has an expansion in which {ϕ} ∪Π is true.6
In the new formalization of quasi-truth, the languageL ′ is, in keeping with
the basic motivation for partial structures, considered to be directly interpreted,
while the interpretation of L ∗ −L ′ = {Ri , F j }i∈I , j∈J is only given through
the interpretation of L ′ and the primary statements Π. This notion of a basic
vocabulary and an auxiliary vocabulary is the basis of many analyses in the received
view (Carnap 1966, §23; Hempel 1958, §2).7 In principle, all results from these
analyses can therefore be used for partial structures. I want to present only one.
IfL ∗ is finite, the Ramsey sentence RL ′(α) of anL ∗-sentence α is defined as∃i∈I Xi∃ j∈J Y jα†. To arrive at α†, one replaces in α the relation symbol Ri by the
mi -place relation variable Xi for every i ∈ I , and the function symbol F j by the
n j -place function variable Y j for every j ∈ J . This gives a new way to formulate
quasi-truth:
Claim 2. If Π˜ and L are finite, then L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partial L -
structure A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if for the correspondingL ′-structure A it
holds that
A RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π . (5)
Proof. Since Π˜ and L are finite, so are Π and L ∗. Therefore, by claim 1, ϕ is
quasi-true in A˜ if and only if A has an expansion C such that C  ϕ∧∧Π. Thus it
has to be shown that there is such an expansion if and only if A RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π.
‘⇐’: Since A  RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π, there is a relation Vi ⊆ Ami for every i ∈ I
and a function G j : A
n j −→ A for every j ∈ J such that {Vi ,G j }i∈I , j∈J satisfies 
ϕ ∧∧Π† in A. Define C so that RCi =Vi for each i ∈ I , F Cj =G j for each j ∈ J ,
and C|L ′ =A. Induction on the complexity of ϕ ∧
∧
Π shows that C  ϕ ∧∧Π.
‘⇒’: Induction shows that {RCi , F Cj }i∈I , j∈J satisfies
 
ϕ ∧∧Π† in A, so that
A  ∃i∈I Xi∃ j∈J Y j
 
ϕ ∧∧Π†.
Somewhat shorter, ϕ is quasi-true in A˜with respect to Π˜ if and only if RL ′
 
ϕ∧∧
Π

is true in the structure corresponding to A˜.
The features of quasi-truth that follow from definition 2 can now also be
recovered from claims 1 and 2. For example, that two incompatible sentences can
6Two further important concepts of the partial structures approach, partial homomorphism and
partial isomorphism, can also be expressed with the help of corresponding structures (see appendix
A).
7Incidentally, the sentences ∀x¯(R+i x¯ → ¬R−i x¯), i ∈ I and ∀x¯∀y∀v¯∀w(F +j x¯y ∧ F +j v¯w ∧∧
1≤r≤n j xr = vr → y = w), j ∈ J , which follow from Π and contain only basic terms, express
that in a partial structure A˜, RA˜,+i ∩RA˜,−i =∅ for all i ∈ I and F A˜j is a partial function for all j ∈ J .
Since they are therefore basic presumptions of the formalism, they are good candidates for analytic
sentences inL ′ (cf. Carnap 1952).
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both be quasi-true in the same partial structure follows from the fact that, given
the primary statements Π, two incompatible sentences can have Ramsey sentences
that are true in a structure that corresponds to a partial structure.
Van Fraassen (1980, p. 56) has famously and influentially argued that, like most
results of logical empiricism, the Ramsey sentence is “off the mark”, a solution
“to purely self-generated problems, and philosophically irrelevant.” If van Fraassen
was right, the preceding results would establish a reductio ad empirismum logicum
of the partial structures approach. But insofar as the partial structures approach
has proven its merits, the inference has to go in the opposite direction: The
tools developed within logical empiricism are more useful than its detractors have
acknowledged.
A Partial homomorphisms and isomorphisms
Bueno et al. (2002, 503f) define partial homomorphisms between partial struc-
tures:
Definition 4. A partial homomorphism from partial structure A˜ to partial struc-
ture B˜ is a mapping f : A −→ B for which the following holds: If a¯ ∈ RA˜,+i
then f (a¯) ∈ RB˜,+i for all i ∈ I , if a¯ ∈ CA˜, j then f (a¯) ∈ CB˜, j and for all a¯ ∈ CA˜, j ,
f
 
F A˜j (a¯)

= F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

for all j ∈ J , and f  c A˜k = cB˜k for all k ∈K .8
Bueno (1997, 596) introduces the notion of a partial isomorphism between
partial structures containing only relations, which can be generalized as follows:
Definition 5. A partial isomorphism from partial structure A˜ to partial structure
B˜ is a bijection f : A−→ B for which the following holds: a¯ ∈ RA˜,+i if and only if
f (a¯) ∈ RB˜,+i for all i ∈ I , a¯ ∈CA˜, j if and only if f (a¯) ∈CB˜, j and for all a¯ ∈CA˜, j ,
f
 
F A˜j (a¯)

= F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

for all j ∈ J , and f  c A˜k = cB˜k for all k ∈K .
The differences between the two definitions are analogous to the differences
between the standard definitions of homomorphism and isomorphism between
structures (Hodges 1993, 5), so that they can be easily discussed together:9
Claim 3. Let A correspond to A˜, andB to B˜. Then f is a partial homomorphism/
partial isomorphism from A˜ to B˜ if and only if f is a homomorphism/isomorphism
from A toB.
Proof. The proof for relations and constants is immediate. For functions, the
following holds:
8For an n-tuple a¯, f (a¯) =
 
f (a1), . . . , f (an)

.
9The left hand side and the right hand side of the slash denote separate conjuncts of claim 3 and
its proof.
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‘⇒’: For all j ∈ J , a¯ ∈ An j , and b ∈ A, a¯b ∈ F +j A if and only if a¯ ∈ CA˜, j and
F A˜j (a¯) = b . This holds only if/if and only if f (a¯) ∈ CB˜, j and F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

= f (b ),
that is, f (a¯) f (b ) ∈ F +j B.
‘⇐’: For all j ∈ J , a¯ ∈ C
A˜, j and F
A˜
j (a¯) = b if and only if a¯b ∈ F +j A. This
holds only if/if and only if f (a¯) f (b ) ∈ F +j B, that is, f (a¯) ∈CB˜, j and F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

=
f (b ).
Somewhat shorter, a mapping between two partial structures is a partial
homomorphism/partial isomorphism if and only if it is a homomorphism/
isomorphism between their corresponding structures.
Claims 1 and 3 reduce the concepts of the partial structures approach to the
model theory of first order logic, claims 2 and 3 reduce them to the model theory
of second order logic. For example, since the truth-value of a sentence of second
order logic is conserved under isomorphisms, it follows from claims 2 and 3 that
the quasi-truth-value of a sentence is conserved under partial isomorphisms.
References
Bueno, O. (1997). Empirical adequacy: A partial structures approach. Studies in
the History and Philosophy of Science, 28(4):585–610.
Bueno, O., French, S., and Ladyman, J. (2002). On representing the relationship
between the mathematical and the empirical. Philosophy of Science, 69:497–518.
Carnap, R. (1952). Meaning postulates. Philosophical Studies, 3(5):65–73.
Carnap, R. (1966). Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science. Basic Books, Inc., New York and London. Edited by
Martin Gardner.
Chang, C. C. and Keisler, H. J. (1990). Model Theory, volume 73 of Studies in Logic
and the Foundations of Mathematics. North Holland, Amsterdam, 3rd edition.
3rd impression 1992.
da Costa, N. and French, S. (1990). The model-theoretic approach in the philoso-
phy of science. Philosophy of Science, 57:248–265.
da Costa, N. and French, S. (2000). Models, theories, and structures: Thirty years
on. Philosophy of Science, 67 (Proceedings):S116–S127.
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese, 30(3–4):265–300. References
are to the corrected reprint (Fine 1997).
7
Sebastian Lutz Quasi-Truth as Truth of a Ramsey Sentence—Draft: 2011–08–22
Fine, K. (1997). Vagueness, truth and logic. In Keefe, R. and Smith, P., editors,
Vagueness. A Reader, pages 119–150. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, and
London.
French, S. and Ladyman, J. (1999). Reinflating the semantic approach. Interna-
tional Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13(2):103–121.
Hempel, C. G. (1958). The theoretician’s dilemma. In Feigl, H., Scriven, M., and
Maxwell, G., editors, Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, volume 2
of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages 173–226. University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN.
Hodges, W. (1993). Model Theory, volume 42 of Encyclopedia of Mathematics and
its Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Digitally printed in
2008.
Hyde, D. (1997). From heaps and gaps to heaps of gluts. Mind, 106(424):641–660.
Le Bihan, S. (2011). Defending the semantic view: What it takes. European Journal
for Philosophy of Science. Forthcoming. doi: 10.1007/s13194-011-0026-6.
Lutz, S. (2011). Generalizing empirical adequacy II: Partial structures. Forthcom-
ing. Preprint: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8743.
Mikenberg, I., da Costa, N. C. A., and Chuaqui, R. (1986). Pragmatic truth and
approximation to truth. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 51(1):201–221.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The Scientific Image. The Clarendon Library of Logic
and Philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
8
